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The final segment of our conference deals with the meaning of
changes within the framework-of Subchapter C, the impact of the
Senate Finance Committee Staff proposals on integrationof the corporate and individual tax, particularly as to distribution reforms,
and the type of corporate tax that might be desirable in a world in
which individual consumption taxation replaced the present income
tax system.
Professor Edwin S. Cohen, opens this part by noting his experiences with the 1956 Advisory Group on Subchapter C, then warns
against an easy acceptance of repeal of General Utilities and other
aspects of the Staff Proposal.He believes that the problem can be
more fruitfully discussed in the context of an integrated form of
tax, where double tax burdens are ameliorated.
Professors Warren and Andrews first discuss two proposals for
restructuringthe tax consequences of corporate distributions- the
integration of the individual and corporate income taxes, as a
means of eliminating double tax burdens and other inequities, and
the American Law Institute Reporter's Study. Professor Warren ilJanuary-February 1985 Vol. 22 No. 1

lustrates the methods for eliminating the double tax. He offers rationales for integration including the economic distortion that results under the current system from the deduction for interest in
debt-financed investment with no deduction at the corporate level
for equity-related dividend payments.
Warren observes that integration proposals have not heretofore
been favorably received because of a combination of sophisticated
factors,including the fact that some corporations,particularlyutilities and financial institutions, already pay little corporate tax. He
further states that the acquisition proposals of the Finance Committee staff are also not inconsistent with adoption of integration,
with the corporatetax converted into a sort of withholding tax with
substantialsimplificationpossibilities.Professor Warren aptly demonstrates the impact of the accelerated cost recovery system on the
integration proposals: "Coupling preferential treatment of income
with full deductibility of interest is sometimes called 'tax
arbitrage.'"
Professor Andrews, the Reporter for the ALI Study, notes that
the ALI project adopted the "acquisition"proposals, most of which
are adopted by the Finance Committee staff report, but that the
"distribution"proposals were not formally adopted by the Institute,
though supported by Professor Andrews himself
While the ALI report did not address the desirability of integration, ProfessorAndrews points out that the Reporter's study on distributions must be reckoned with in considering integration.By way
of examples, he illustrates how the tax law creates a bias against
newly contributed equity capital. He concludes his presentation by
describing the consumption tax alternative and its relationship to
the corporate tax - potentially on a cash-flow basis.

IMPACT OF PROPOSED CHANGES IN
SUBCHAPTER C

EDWIN S. COHEN*

I have spent a lot of time struggling with the problems of revising
Subchapter C, going back to 1949 when the American Law Institute
first started on its federal income tax project. I spent many long
weekends debating Subchapter C with Professor Stanley Surrey
(Professor at Harvard Law School); with Bill Warren of Columbia
Law School (later Dean of Columbia Law School); and with Tommy
Tarleau (first Tax Legislative Counsel of the Treasury Department
in the 1930's and 1940's, former Chairman of the Tax Section of the
American Bar Association, and New York practitioner). We debated
these issues weekend after weekend in the old Kent Hall at Columbia University and at Cambridge. Almost every Sunday morning
there arrived a special delivery letter with a new draft of some section of Subchapter C. This occurred to such an extent that I sent
Bill Warren a special delivery Christmas card designed to wake him
up early on Christmas morning in response to all the times I was
awakened with these special deliveries arriving early on a Sunday
morning.
Those of you who have debated with Stanley Surrey for any
length of time will understand why I'm now only five foot four and a
half inches in height. I assure you when this debate started in 1949 I
was 6 feet tall. I was worn down four inches by Stanley during the
four years we debated Subchapter C, and the other four inches in
the four years I spent at the Treasury Department. But they were
delightful experiences. We produced a draft revision of Subchapter
* Partner, Covington & Burling, Washington, D.C.; Member, Board of Directors,
and Chairman of Tax Committee, Chamber of Commerce of the United States; B.A.,
1933, University of Richmond; J.D., 1936, University of Virginia.
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C by about 1952 or 1953. Then President Eisenhower took office and
ordered a full-scale revision of the tax law. This effort produced the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954. Our draft was submitted to the
Treasury and considered by the Treasury and the Congressional
staff. Finally, a proposal was introduced in March of 1954. The proposal passed the House within several weeks without adequate opportunity for review. Then the Senate made substantial changes in
the House revision of the Subchapter C revisions. The Bill became
law in August.
Because the Subchapter C section was somewhat unsatisfactory,
when Wilbur Mills became a Ways and Means Subcommittee
Chairman in late 1956 he set up the Advisory Group on Subchapter
C and empaneled seven people who met for months on end. By the
end of 1957 we produced a draft report containing a suggested revision, together with a draft statute, much as has been done recently
by the staff of the Senate Finance Committee. Our draft report was
publicly available for comments for about a year when we filed our
final report. Meantime the American Law Institute further considered the subject, and I believe Larry Stone was one of the young
graduates of Harvard at that time who worked on the project.
We have seen that while none of those proposals were enacted in
full, much of the work found its way into the statutes. I think the
present section 302,1 regarding redemptions, came largely from that
work, as did section 3062 on stock dividends, section 3183 on the
attribution rules, section 355,4 and a number of other provisions, but
we've never had a wholesale revision of Subchapter C. The work of
the American Law Institute and that of the Senate Finance Committee staff in the last few years has gone back over that whole area,
and they've done a remarkably fine job in an extremely difficult area.
We are all grateful to them.
It seems to me that the overall problem with revising Subchapter
C, and one that the Congress will soon face, is that this process is
much like trying to climb a tree. You go up the trunk of the tree,
and pretty soon you have to decide whether to take the first branch
off to the right or the first one off to the left. Eventually, you work
your way out towards the end of a limb, where you find that when
you look back you can see that somebody's going to saw off the limb.
It isn't easy to change your course at that point. You really have to
go back down to the trunk of the tree and start over again.
That's the nature of the problem with this General Utilities5 mat1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

I.R.C. § 302 (1982).
I.R.C. § 306 (1982).
I.R.C. § 318 (1982).
I.R.C. § 355 (1982).
General Utilities & Operating Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 200 (1935).
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ter; you veer off in one direction or the other, depending upon how
you deal with General Utilities. I think that in the 1950's we were
inclined to think that the problems largely stemmed from the fact
that when a corporation completely liquidated while holding appreciated property, the property will likely pass to the shareholders with a
stepped-up basis. Our conclusion was that we should have a system
more akin to section 3336 (with a number of changes) in which the
basis would not be stepped-up but the shareholders would take the
property with a substituted basis.
The latest ALI project and the Finance Committee project led by
Andre LeDuc start in the other direction and say, "Let's have the
property come out to the shareholders at a basis of fair market
value, and to compensate for that let us have a recognition of gain at
the corporate level, whether there's a distribution in kind or whether
the property is sold to third parties and the proceeds are
distributed."
Now I find that - as others have already said, as John Nolan has
said, as Dick Shaw and Dudley Lang have just said - to be a rather
extreme solution, and my guess is that the Congress will not in the
near term adopt it, because of the objections that will have been
made against it.
I testified, as Lester said, last October before the Senate Finance
Committee on behalf of the Chamber of Commerce of the United
States, which has some 225,000 members, of which over 200,000
would be considered small closely held businesses. Many are unincorporated, but quite a lot are incorporated. I presented a case to the
Committee similar to those that have been put to you in the last two
days. A person started a small drugstore business 30 or 40 years ago
by building a drugstore on a piece of land purchased for $10,000.
After a period of 30 to 40 years, when he is about to retire, the land
is now worth $110,000. So there's an unrealized gain of $100,000.
You can probably get more attention from some of the members of
the Senate Finance Committee if you use an illustration of a farmer
who bought his land for $10,000 and found that it appreciated over a
period of years to $110,000. But I thought in fairness I'd start with a
drugstore operator first and then bring in the farmer later.
Other cases may not be as appealing; but if the farmer had not
incorporated his farm and decided to sell later with a $100,000 capital gain, he would pay under existing law a tax of $20,000. But as
6.

I.R.C. § 333 (1982).

indicated earlier, if he had put the farm in a corporation, incurring
the double tax, the tax (assuming it is a capital gains tax at both the
corporate and shareholder level) would be $42,400. This is a tax
more than twice as great than would be due if he had not
incorporated.
I find it difficult to believe that the Congress is going to accept
that result in the near term. As some have said, if this were to be the
case the lawyer's advice is likely to be, even more than under present
law not to put appreciated property in a corporation, but keep it out
and lease it to the company. I find it to be a more complex method,
both for the IRS and for the taxpayer, because of the difficulty of
knowing what the fair rental value should be.
If the owner comes down to the question of sale of the property to
others, it seems to me that he'll try to sell to a corporation that
would be willing to elect a carry-over basis so there would be no
corporate tax on the sale. How to identify that corporation would not
be easy; we might have problems of locating loss corporations to
purchase the property, though I don't think the SFC Report says
anything about selling to loss corporations. There would probably
have to be a prohibition against the purchasing corporation being a
charitable or educational organization, or otherwise the University of
San Diego and other tax-exempt institutions would be buying up
corporations because it wouldn't mind using a carry-over basis.
Now I think the practical effect of the proposal would be that once
land or other assets went into corporate form, it might never come
out of corporate ownership, because sales to individuals could not be
made with a carry-over basis. Sales to individual buyers or partnerships would mean that there would have to be a double tax; and as I
think Dudley or Dick mentioned earlier, the market price of the corporate stock may be lowered because you may have a more limited
group of buyers that would be in a position to buy the assets in a
fashion that would make the double tax inapplicable.
One of the things that I think we ought to give attention to, if this
system is to be enacted, is what kind of relief from the double tax
will be provided? Some of those possible forms of relief have been
mentioned, but I think others are possibly available and we ought to
think of them because maybe with appropriate relief Congress could
be convinced to adopt the system. The one the staff has proposed
seems to me to create a number of problems. I discussed their proposal with Andre and with others on his advisory group, so I know that
there are significant arguments in favor of it. However, I found the
proposal somewhat difficult. As I recall it, the proposal last October
was that if the sale or liquidation occurred before April 1, 1984,
there would be no corporate tax. If it occurred in the last eight
months of this year, there would be a 4% corporate tax, and if it
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occurred after the end of this year, there would be at least an 8%
corporate tax, increasing gradually to 28% thereafter.
This approach puts advisors in a dilemma, because their first advice to a client who owned stock of a company with appreciated
property would be to liquidate the corporation before this proposal
goes into effect. But then the answer would be that the shareholder
may have a tax to pay on the liquidation - a 20% tax to pay on his
liquidation gain without having the funds with which to pay the tax.
Moreover he might not be in a position to operate the business as an
individual.
Another aspect would be that if he waited until he died, under
present law (though some object to this rule in section 10147), the
basis of his stock would change to market value at the time of his
death, and his estate or his heirs could liquidate the company after
his death without a corporate tax and without a shareholder tax. But
if he did not die before this new regime went into effect, his heirs
would suffer the burden of a corporate tax.
Facing the above result, the best tax advice to him might be suicide, because if he died before the proposal went into effect, all
would be well. He might look at his children with some misgivings,
especially if there were any guns around the house. I'm not inclined
to think that system of relief is desirable.
Another system of relief would be to give the shareholder a credit
for the corporate tax paid, and while that has been previously rejected as being too complicated, if we have an integrated form of
tax, as Bill Andrews and Al Warren will discuss in a few moments,
we may have to struggle with that problem anyway. Many of us
have written about integration of the corporate and individual tax
with respect to ordinary dividends, but how to integrate the tax with
respect to liquidating distributions deserves more attention. It may
be that we'd have this problem anyway if we are to have some form
of corporate shareholder integration.
Another solution that has been favored by committees of the
American Bar Association Section of Taxation is to exempt from the
corporate tax all capital assets that have been held more than three
years. I think that would eliminate most of the problems, but one
can ask, "Why three years?" Maybe because three years is mentioned in section 3418 with respect to collapsible corporations. I
gather there may be a consensus developing in the Bar Association
7. I.R.C. § 1014 (1982).
8. I.R.C. § 341 (1982).

that if you eliminate from corporate tax all assets which when sold
would produce long-term capital gain, the Bar Association might
find these proposals acceptable. However, if such an exception were
made, the difficulty with the proposal overruling General Utilities on
liquidation would be that the only thing we would be changing in
practical effect might be the sale or distribution of inventory kept on
a first in, first out basis.
I hope that in the days and weeks ahead, as a result of careful
consideration such as in conferences like this one, where the issues
are brought out and discussed, the Congress will move ahead and we
will try for some system which will not insist upon the double tax on
liquidation. I think there is so much that is good in these proposals
that I would hate to see them fail to be enacted because of resistance
to the double tax in cases such as we discussed. We do have to remember that there are a lot of other proposals coming next year,
including proposals for increases in revenue which have been mentioned by our two able luncheon speakers.
It is hard to say how the Subchapter C changes will fare in that
regime. As a matter of fact, it's hard to say what will happen in a
Congress at any time. I recall that in 1969 in the Senate Finance
Committee when we were in Executive Session, and there was confusion as to what amendment was to be voted upon next, one of the
senators turned to me and whispered, "Bismarck once said no man
should ever see how either laws or sausages are made." I am sure
that we will do better than that in the corporate tax revision.

CORPORATE INTEGRATION PROPOSALS
AND

ACRS

ALVIN C. WARREN, JR.*

INTRODUCTION

My comments are divided into two parts. First, I will describe proposals to integrate the individual and corporate income taxes. Second, I will discuss the effect of the accelerated cost recovery system
(ACRS) on those proposals and the ALI Report 1 on corporate
distributions.
INTEGRATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND CORPORATE INCOME TAXES

The Proposals
In the mid and late 1970's, there were a number of proposals to
integrate the individual and corporate income taxes, including a proposal by the Treasury Department which, while never officially made
public, was widely circulated among tax lawyers. These proposals,
while called integration, did not eliminate the corporation as a taxable entity. Rather, they eliminated the additional tax burden on corporate earnings. Proponents of these plans, such as myself,2 tended
to call them integration; those who were more skeptical tended to
style the proposals "dividend relief." Similar European systems often
go by the name of "imputation."
There are basically two methods of eliminating the double tax
* Professor of Law, Harvard Law School; B.A., 1966, Yale University; J.D., 1969,
University of Chicago.
1. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT, SUBCHAPTER C:
PROPOSALS OF THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE ON CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS AND DisPOSITIONS AND REPORTER'S STUDY ON CORPORATE DISTRIBUTIONS (1982).
2. See Warren, The Relation and Integration of Individualand CorporateIncome
Taxes, 94 HARV. L. REV. 717 (1981).
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burden on corporate earnings. The first, and arguably most straightforward, would be to permit a deduction at the corporate level for
dividends paid out to individual shareholders. The second and more
commonly proposed method involves continuing the tax at the corporate level, but giving shareholders a credit for corporate taxes paid,
with the credit available when corporate earnings are distributed to
shareholders.
A simple example will illustrate how shareholder credit integration would work. Consider a corporation that earned $100 in taxable
income and paid $46 in corporate taxes, levied at the rate of 46%.
After taxes, the corporation would have $54, which could be distributed to its shareholders. If the corporation made a distribution of
$54 under the integration proposal, the receiving shareholder would
"gross-up" that $54 to a pre-tax distribution of $100, just as wageearners now gross-up after-tax wages to pre-tax wages, when computing the income tax due. The individual shareholder's tax rate
would be applied to the gross dividend, and a credit would be available for the $46 paid in corporate taxes. If the shareholder were a
50% taxpayer, there would be a $50 gross tax, against which the
shareholder could take a credit for $46, requiring $4 in taxes from
the individual shareholder. Having paid that amount, the shareholder would be left with $50 in cash and would be in exactly the
same position he would have been in, had the investment been made
on an individual account rather than through a corporate entity. As
long as the credit was refundable, all taxpayers would be treated as
they would have been treated had they invested individually. As a
result, the separate and additional burden of the corporate tax would
be eliminated.
Rationales
There are two rationales for moving from the current double tax
system to an integrated system: the first is a conceptual or structural
rationale; the second, and more important from my perspective, is an
economic rationale. The conceptual or structural rationale begins
with the premise that only human beings ultimately pay taxes, so
that when thinking about fundamental reform of our tax system, we
should focus on which human beings will bear any particular tax
burden. An integrated system would make the corporate tax a structural part of the individual income tax, in that the corporate levy
would become merely a withholding mechanism for the individual
income tax.
The economic rationale for integration is that the current tax system interferes with business transactions in a variety of ways, particularly with respect to alternative methods of financing corporate investment. The most familiar part of this interference results from the
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deductibility of interest payments and the nondeductibility of dividend payments. The interrelationship of the tax provisions affecting
alternative methods of financing corporate investment is, however,
considerably more complicated than that. This is a matter that Bill
Andrews will discuss when he describes the ALI Report.3 The important point for my present purposes is that integration, like the
proposals in the ALI Report, would eliminate the unfortunate effects
of current law with regard to various methods of financing corporate
investment.
Major Structural Issues
Given the basic integration proposal and the rationales offered by
its proponents, there were two major structural issues that were
widely discussed in the 1970s. First, a choice had to be made between the dividend deduction method and the shareholder credit
method. In general, these discussions yielded a preference for the
shareholder credit method, in part because that method was thought
to give the tax system more flexibility with regard to the treatment
of exempt and foreign shareholders.
The second structural issue results from the fact that not all corporate income is fully taxed. If, in my earlier example of $100 in
corporate income, only fifty of those dollars were fully taxable, and
the other fifty were for some reason not taxable at all, the corporation would have paid only $23 in corporate taxes, leaving $77 to distribute to shareholders. At that point, a systemic or structural decision would have to be made as to whether the preferred character of
the corporate income would be passed through to shareholders or
eliminated when those earnings were distributed.
Analysts who advocated pass-through tended to argue that the rationale for integration was to treat individuals who earned income
through corporate solution in the same manner they would have been
treated had they earned that income individually. If shareholders
would have benefited from the preference as individual investors,
they should also benefit from preferences for corporate income. That
result could be accomplished structurally by requiring the corporation to maintain records of preferred and taxable income and reporting those amounts to shareholders on distribution.
Analysts like myself who favored elimination of preferences on
3. See Andrews, The ALI Reporter's Proposals on Corporate Distributions and
Corporate Taxation with a Personal Comsumption Tax, 22 SAN DIEGO L. REV., 333
infra.

distribution argued that most corporate tax preferences, particularly
the accelerated capital recovery provisions, had to be understood as
responses to the prevailing system, which involved an additional level
of corporate tax. In this view, elimination of the additional level of
corporate tax would also remove any reason to continue those preferences when the corporate earnings were distributed out of corporate
solution.
A variety of techniques could be used to implement this view.
Those of you who work in the foreign area know that a number of
our trading partners, particularly in Western Europe, have accomplished this result by a device that goes under a variety of names,
but is essentially a special withholding tax. When there is a distribution from the corporation to the shareholder, this special withholding
levy assures that the appropriate corporate-level tax has been collected for the credit assumed at the shareholder level. In the U.K.,
the levy that serves this function is called the "advance corporation
tax."
Fate of the Integration Proposals
Now just a word on the fate of these proposals. They never got
very far in terms of the legislative process in the 1970's. That can be
explained by a number of factors, but one is particularly interesting
because it surprised a number of interested parties. Integration proposals, which would have eliminated the additional burden of the
corporate tax, were strenuously opposed by many American corporations, particularly utilities and financial institutions that already paid
very little in the way of federal income tax. Their argument was and I will put it much more crudely than they did - that removing
the additional burden of the corporate tax would not benefit them,
and that reform should leave corporate taxpayers favored under existing law in a similarly favored position after reform. This argument
was put in terms of fairness: preferred tax treatment had already
been reflected in efficient capital markets by the creation of a premium for share prices of the benefited companies. Current investors
had therefore already paid for the tax benefits, because the original
beneficiaries of preferential treatment had long since sold out. Given
capitalization of preferential treatment in the capital markets, the
argument concluded that it would be unfair to enact tax reform
which would cause the relative value of these shares to fall, harming
investors who had paid the premium demanded by the market, without somehow protecting those shareholders.
To the extent there is new interest in the integration proposals, as
several other speakers have suggested, this position is something that
will have to be reckoned with in the development of proposals.

CorporateIntegration Proposals
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EFFECT OF

ACRS

Integration and the ALI Report would both reduce or eliminate
the biases under existing law that Bill Andrews will describe, as well
as the double tax burden of our current system. Since these proposals were developed, Congress has substantially accelerated the recovery of capital costs by enacting ACRS.4 I now want to address the
assertion sometimes made that because ACRS has eliminated much
of the corporate tax base, there is no longer any need for comprehensive reform of the taxation of corporate distributions.
Elimination of the Corporate Tax Base by ACRS
There are two steps in the analysis used to reach the conclusion
that ACRS, in conjunction with the investment tax credit, effectively
eliminates the corporate tax. The first step is that present value of
the investment tax credit and ACRS deductions gives the investor in
five-year property the equivalent of the tax benefit that the investor
would have had from currently deducting the investment. The Senate Finance Committee Report on the 1982 changes in ACRS suggests that this result was intended.'
The second step in the analysis is that expensing (or the equivalent
in present value under ACRS) is itself equivalent to exempting from
tax any income produced by the expensed asset. An example may be
helpful. Suppose that you had $100 and the rate of return on invested capital was 10%. You would be happy to invest in a tax-free
investment that returned 10%, so your $100 would be worth $110
after a year. But you would be equally happy to invest in a fully
taxable investment, the cost of which was currently deductible. If
you were a 50% taxpayer, you could make a gross deductible investment of $200 with your $100, because the deduction would immediately reduce your current taxes by $100. The next year your investment would be worth $220, and you would have no basis because the
costs had been fully expensed, so you would have to pay the Treasury $110 in taxes if you disinvested, leaving the same $110 that you
would have had, had you invested in the tax-free investment.
The example depends on simplifying assumptions and does not
take into account the reaction of capital markets, but the general
point is valid: assuming tax rates stay the same, a current deduction
for a capital expenditure accomplishes roughly what would be ac4. I.R.C. § 168 (1982).
5. S. REP. No. 494, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 122-26 (1982).

complished by exempting the return on the capital investment. That
equivalence was reflected in the ACRS rates adopted in 1982, with
the result that the effective tax rate on income produced by new corporate investments in five-year property was reduced to zero, assuming that the discount rate chosen to equate ACRS and the investment tax credit with expensing was accurate.
Tax Arbitrage
If that were the end of the story, one could easily conclude that
there was no longer any need for what we have been discussing as
distribution reform. However, when Congress adopted this very accelerated depreciation, it did nothing about the interest deduction.
With respect to ACRS property, we are in approximately the same
position we would be in with respect to tax-exempt interest if section
2656 did not exist. Nothing in current law prohibits coupling the effective exemption of income accomplished by ACRS for five-year
property with full deductibility of interest on debt incurred to
finance the purchase of such property.
Let us return to my example of acquiring $200 worth of deductible property and financing half of it with the tax savings. If you
borrowed the other half at 10%, you would have no out-of-pocket
investment. The next year, the property would be worth $220, so you
would owe the federal government $110 and your lender $110, if we
ignore, for a moment, the effect of the interest deduction. The result
so far would be appropriate, because you would receive no economic
benefit from borrowing at an interest rate of 10% to invest at a 10%
rate of return. Once the interest deduction is taken into account,
however, you will receive an after-tax benefit - $5 if you are a 50%
taxpayer - from a transaction that would be a wash, apart from
taxes. My example is, of course, an extreme one and for simplicity
involves a deductible asset, rather than an ACRS asset that yields
tax benefits equal in present value to a current deduction. But the
general conclusion is valid: coupling accelerated cost recovery provisions, which result in less than full taxation of the income produced
by the ACRS property, with full deductibility of interest can result
in after-tax profits on investments that would not be attractive on a
pre-tax basis. Coupling preferential treatment of income with full
deductibility of interest is sometimes called "tax arbitrage." 7
6.
7.

I.R.C. § 265 (1982).
See, e.g., Bradford, The Economics of Tax Policy Toward Savings, in 2 THE
GOVERNMENT AND CAPITAL FORMATION 11, 43-44 (G. von Furstenberg ed. 1980);
Steuerle, Tax Arbitrage,Inflation, and the Taxation of Interest Payments and Receipts,
30 WAYNE L. REV. 991 (1984).
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The Future
A major policy issue for the future of the corporate tax is the extent to which tax arbitrage will be permitted. That issue is related to
our current subject because full interest deductibility means that the
bias in favor of debt finance that Professor Andrews will describe
continues to exist, even after the enactment of ACRS. Thus there
continues to be a need for distribution reform.
My own preference would be to see the problem as Congress having made a mistake with respect to the treatment of assets in enacting ACRS, so that we should move back toward economic depreciation (under which tax arbitrage is not a problem) and then adopt
integration or the ALI Reporter's proposals. An alternative would be
to take the treatment of assets as given and attempt to limit the
deductibility of interest, as is done by section 265 with respect to
investments in tax-exempt bonds. Whether the preferable remedy
lies with assets or liabilities, the most important point to understand
is the essential inconsistency of current law.

THE ALI REPORTER'S PROPOSALS ON
CORPORATE DISTRIBUTIONS AND
CORPORATE TAXATION WITH A

PERSONAL CONSUMPTION TAX

WILLIAM D. ANDREWS*

INTRODUCTION

These comments fall in three separate parts. First, I will describe
the American Law Institute (ALI) Reporter's proposals on corporate
distributions.' These may be viewed as alternatives to the integration
proposals discussed by Al Warren. 2 Second, some brief comments
about the impact of ACRS on these proposals to compare with his
comments about the impact of ACRS on integration.' Finally, on a
different tack, there are some brief remarks about what should be
done with the corporate income tax generally if the individual income tax were re-focused as personal tax on consumed income or an
income-based personal consumption tax.
THE ALI REPORTER'S PROPOSALS

This is going to be very difficult for me. I am used to presenting
these proposals and arguing for them over a two- or three-day pe* Eli Goldston Professor of Law, Harvard Law School; A.B., 1952, Amherst;
LL.B. 1955, Harvard Law School.
1. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT, SUBCHAPTER C:
PROPOSALS OF THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE ON CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS AND DisPOSITIONS AND REPORTER'S STUDY ON CORPORATE DISTRIBUTIONS (1982) [hereinafter
cited as ALI REPORT].

2. See Warren, Corporate Integration Proposals and ACRS, 22 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 325, supra.

3. Warren, supra note 2, at
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riod, and that does not seem to be quite what is planned, so I will try
to refrain from arguing. I will remit you to the ALI Report for that,
and just try to lay before you a summary of what you will find there
if you go look at it.
The ALI study started out to look at all of Subchapter C. We
decided there were ripe opportunities for simplifying reform of acquisition transactions, so we sorted those issues out and addressed
them first. Ultimately, the American Law Institute adopted proposals concerning acquisition transactions, and those have been indirectly the subject of discussion for a large part of our two days here.
The ALI Report is available, although at this point the Senate Finance Committee staff report 4 is the most recent study of those
ideas, and is perhaps where one should begin a current study.
But acquisitions are not the whole subject; one is left with the big
question of how we should tax corporate distributions. In particular,
just to define the matter by reference to issues under existing law,
what are we going to do about the debt/equity problem? You have a
corporation sitting there, not being acquired by anybody, but it is
making distributions. It claims they are payments of interest, deductible at the corporate level. Under certain circumstances the government will say no, they are nondeductible dividends. What should
we do about that imbroglio?
The other main issue would be the shareholder issue: what to do
about nondividend distributions? As we all know, dividends bear a
double tax: they are taxed to the corporation and then, without any
deduction to the corporation, they are taxed again to the shareholders. What should be done about all the issues of dividend equivalence
raised under present law by the ordinary-income treatment of dividends and dividend-equivalent distributions?
At this point I must insert two disclaimers. First, the ALI project
did turn to these issues (the "distribution issues") and study them.
The Reporter produced proposals concerning them, the consultants
spent a lot of time on them, and the tax advisory group had discussions of them. However, the Institute refrained from adopting any
proposals concerning distributions, and neither the tax advisory
group nor the consultants took any formal positions approving or disapproving the Reporter's proposals. Therefore I am the only person
in the world on record as favoring these proposals, and they are entitled to no greater weight than what critical examination will show
them to deserve on their own merit. The Reporter's proposals concerning corporate distributions have been published as an appendix
in the final report on the corporate part of the current ALI project,
4. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, 98TH CONG., 1ST SESS., THE REFORM
AND SIMPLIFICATION OF THE INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS (Comm. Print 1983).
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but it must be clearly understood that they are not proposals of the
Institute.
Now the second disclaimer I need to make really grows out of this
observation: I think it is reasonably clear that integration would tend
to eliminate the distribution issues. To put it differently, integration
is a sweeping solution to the distribution issues. If you had integration, I do not think the debt/equity problem would continue. One
could say we already have integration with respect to debt capital,
and if you introduced it with respect to equity capital, the distinction
between debt and equity would become relatively insignificant. I
think the problem of distinguishing between dividend and nondividend distributions would likewise tend to disappear.
The disclaimer I need to emphasize at this point is that even in the
Reporter's study itself, the ALI did not address the question of the
desirability of integration. We simply defined the scope of our study
not to include the possibility of integration. We assumed continuation of the classical system of double taxation of corporate earnings
and addressed ourselves to improvement, perfection, and refinement
of that system. This should not be interpreted as a rejection of integration; we did not evaluate integration. Some of the people connected with the project were very involved with the development of
integration proposals outside the ALI project, and I think they remain convinced that integration is the direction to go. Others of us
have had different degrees of skepticism about integration. However,
no effort was made in the ALI project to work out these differences.
Now, having made that disclaimer, let me say I think that the
ALI Reporter's study on distributions has nevertheless become something that one has to take into account in considering integration,
because what it shows is an alternative way of dealing with some of
the same problems. I will get back to that in a few moments.
THE EFFECTS OF THE PROPOSALS ON CORPORATE DISTRIBUTIONS

All right, now, how can I best describe to you the content of these
proposals? We ruled out integration as beyond the scope of what we
were going to consider, but on the other hand, we did not go back
and say we will write a version of what the Treasury ought to come
out with under section 385. 5 We also, did not review the rules of
section 3026 and consider how they ought to be revised. The com5. I.R.C. § 385 (1982).
6. I.R.C. § 302 (1982).

mentary in fact includes a brief discussion of possible revisions in the
dividend equivalence rules,7 but they are not part of the Reporter's
proposals.
We decided to take a little broader view of the matter by trying to
step back to ask what are the intrinsic problems besetting the present system. Even though we outlawed integration as a solution to
begin with, we found ourselves talking about the same problems to
which integration is addressed, and trying to see what could be done
about them within the context of the classical system.
When we tried to define the problems that way, we got back to
thin.king in terms of biases or distortions that are reasonably familiar
because they are described in the literature leading up to integration
proposals, although in the end we have insisted upon stating or defining the biases a little differently. I want to just go through our thinking by taking what is familiar first and then going on to what is
often overlooked.
What is familiar is the comparison in cost-of-capital terms between debt capital in a corporation, and newly contributed equity
capital. The argument is that the present corporate tax discriminates
against equity capital by raising its cost through imposition of a corporate income tax. Let us just go through some numbers.
Assume that a corporation has an opportunity to invest $1,000 at
a before-tax yield of 10%. The question now arises, depending upon
the way the corporate investment is financed, how much of that return can be paid back to the investor. If you raised the $1,000 by
borrowing, then you could pay the full $100 a year back to the investor. You would have $100 of taxable corporate income from the investment, but it would be offset by a $100 interest deduction for
payment of the yield over to the investor. There would not be any
corporate tax increase if the interest you pay equals what you earn
on the investment of the borrowed funds, and it is therefore sometimes said that the corporate income tax does not create any bias (or
interpose any wedge) with respect to debt financing of corporate
investment.
On the other hand, if you were to raise the $1,000 by selling stock,
and if you got a before-tax yield of $100 on the corporate investment
of these funds, then you would have to pay $46 of that return in
corporate tax. The remaining $54 to distribute to the stockholders
would only be a 5.4% return on their investment. Therefore, the tax
stands in the way of making what we would think were presumptively desirable investments. The matter is frequently stated in terms
of what you would have to earn if the stockholder demands a 10%
return to make his investment; you would have to earn 18.5% at the
7.

ALl REPORT, supra note 1, 417-27.
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corporate level to pay 10% to the investor, because you would have
to earn $185 to have $100 left after you have paid the corporate tax.
This analysis is quite correct as far as it goes, and indeed it points
up one of the problems that we ended up wanting to address. But it
omits any consideration of what is statistically, numerically, and in
every other way, the most important way of raising equity capital,
which is not by selling shares but by accumulating earnings that
might otherwise be distributed. Consequently, we tried to push the
analysis forward with respect to accumulated equity. Now let us just
pursue that in the same terms. Suppose a corporation- has an opportunity to make a $1,000 investment that will return $100 a year.
How will that translate through to the return at the investor level if
the $1,000 is raised by not paying out a dividend, i.e., by reducing
dividends from what they might otherwise have been? If one just
looks at the $100 return, the answer seems to be the same; the $100
which is received as a return on the investment will be subject to tax
of $46 and that will leave only $54 to distribute. But what is the $54
to be compared with? It presumably should be compared to the return on another investment with the same cost. But what is the cost
to the investors of the corporate investment in this case? I think the
answer is - for those of you who like algebra - the principal
amount of the investment divided by (1 - ti), where t i is the individual income tax rate. Or to put it in terms of the example and a
couple of hypothetical tax rates, if the investor were a 50% tax
bracket taxpayer, then withholding $1,000 in dividends from him
would only cost him $500 in terms of what alternative investment he
might have made if you had paid him the dividend.
If you now consider a return of $54 per year on a $500 investment
for whatever length of time it lasts, you will discover that it is not
less than 10% at all, but a little more! It is indeed 10.8%, or slightly
better than the rate of return that would have been realized if the
investment had been debt instead of stock. Of course this comparison
is quite sensitive to the tax rate involved. If the shareholder's tax
rate were 40%, the cost to him of his corporation retaining $1000 of
earnings would be $600, and a return of $54 on $600 would be only
9%. Finally, if I assume a 46% stockholder, the cost to him of the
corporation withholding $1,000 will be $540, and an after-tax yield
of $54 on an after-tax investment of $540 will be exactly 10%.
The outcome of this particular set of comparisons is that if the
corporate tax rate equals the individual shareholder's tax rate, the
investment return will not be distorted by the imposition of the cor-

porate income tax system. Perhaps a better way to state it would be
that the return is indeed subject to the adverse bias of a corporate
income tax, but that there is an offsetting bias in favor of the arrangement due to the deferral of individual tax associated with the
accumulation of earnings.
If you read the ALI Report you will find examples of this analysis
applied several ways. I guess one way to summarize it is to say
something a little like Larry Stone's remark this morning: it is not a
totally logical system but maybe it works better than we had any
right to think it would, because there is this considerable area of
compensating biases in which the additional burden of the corporate
income tax tends to be offset by a favorable bias under the individual
income tax.
The compensation is not perfect by any means. In particular, as
individual rates vary from the corporate rate it does not work. Integration, I think, is the only way to achieve anything like complete
elimination of bias for people whose tax rates are substantially below
the corporate rate.
But even if we confine attention to shareholders whose tax rates
approximate the corporate rate, there are two very substantial uncompensated biases, and these are what the Reporter's proposals
address.
The first substantial bias is against the raising of capital by issuing
shares. Even though accumulation of equity tends to have offsetting
tax advantages that make it comparable to debt financing, there are
situations in which corporations do raise capital by issuing shares,
and there is no reason why the tax law ought to be biased against
that. So we end up with the conclusion that when correctly conceived, there is a bias against newly contributed equity capital.
The other substantial uncompensated bias has to do with rates of
tax on distributions. If you work back through the analysis indicating how the cost of equity capital raised by accumulating earnings
might come out quite close to the cost of debt capital, you will find
that it depends not only on some parity between corporate and individual tax rates on earnings, but also on a substantial constancy of
tax rate on distributions. The arithmetic assumed the same rate of
tax on the later distribution as would have been imposed on a present distribution, and without that assumption it will be much more
favorable to pursue whatever course of conduct involves the lower
rate. Under our present law there are a number of ways that distributions may be made in nondividend form. These are subject to
much lower taxes than dividends, and there is a very substantial uncompensated bias in favor of such distributions. This may appear as
a bias in favor of accumulation if delay is perceived as facilitating
the making of nondividend distributions. However, sometimes it will
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work the other way; a sale of stock, for example, may present an
opportunity for making nondividend distributions prior to the accumulation of earnings, and then the tax law will be biased against
accumulation.
This analysis has been made in pretty abstract terms; how closely
does it correspond with actual corporate behavior? Without going
into great detail, I would submit that it corresponds very well. It is a
fact that most corporations raise the overwhelming majority of their
equity capital by accumulation rather than share issues, except in
the public utility area. It is a little hard to understand why, by anyone's mode of analysis, but public utilities do in fact go on paying
dividends even while they are simultaneously raising capital by the
issue of new stock.
Other corporations for the most part raise equity capital over the
long run by setting their dividend rate in relation to their earnings to
provide for desired levels of growth. In close corporations that often
means the highest permissable percentage of accumulation. In publicly held corporations, it is an amount that corresponds with what
they see as their long-term capital needs. Share issues are basically
used only to take care of situations where that just will not work.
What about nondividend distributions? Does corporate behavior
generally reflect a bias in favor of nondividend distributions? Perhaps that is a more complicated question. If we talk about close corporations, we certainly do find behavior reflecting the bias. Indeed,
the name of the game in close corporation tax planning is to be sure
that as much as possible comes out in nondividend form. If that
means waiting until later, that will be the goal. If, on the other hand,
there is an opportunity to take funds out now on a nondividend basis
as compared with dividends later, I think we are all familiar with the
fact that well-counseled taxpayers will try to take them out now,
when the opportunity presents itself, at nondividend rates.
Public corporations are much harder to judge. Public corporations
continue paying substantial dividends, and in some people's view
they overlook opportunities to reduce taxes by purchasing their
shares or engaging more widely in nondividend distributions. A number of economists are quite interested in why that occurs, and are
not satisfied with any of the answers that have been offered to that
question. I think there is also some sense that the willingness of public corporations to go on subjecting their shareholders to ordinary
income taxes on dividends may be changing. Also if one recognizes
corporate acquisitions for cash or debt as a form of nondividend dis-

tribution, then I believe there is room to think that the tax system
may be one substantial factor inducing an increase in such
transactions.
The proposals are addressed directly to the uncompensated biases
just as I have described them. The first proposal has to do with
newly contributed equity: It would seek to relieve the bias against
newly contributed equity by giving a limited interest-like deduction
for dividends paid on newly issued stock. Unlike proposals for integration by way of dividend deduction, the ALI Reporter's proposal
would be limited to an interest-like rate of return on the amount
invested. The rationale is simply to give equal treatment to a new
stock issue and a debt issue. If you issue debt you get an interest
deduction; if you issue stock this proposal will give you the same
deduction, as long as you are making some distribution taxable to
the recipient. Most people well-informed about this proposal came to
the conclusion that if you could not have general integration, then
this proposal would be a welcome improvement. I should think subsequent experience with the difficulty of doing anything rational
under section 385 might be read as confirming that conclusion, and I
would hope that if we are not going to have general integration people will come to see this as a useful proposal.
The second proposal deals with the other major uncompensated
bias, which has to do with nondividend distributions. It is equally
sweeping. It says, in effect, the system will only work right if there is
a comparable tax burden on every distribution. It is not sufficient to
equalize burdens on dividend-equivalent distributions; all distributions, even if quite unlike dividends in their effect on shareholders,
must bear similar tax burdens. This includes complete redemptions
and acquisitions of other corporations, and anything else that has the
effect of taking money out of corporate solution and freeing it from
the prospective burden of the corporate income tax. It may not be
feasible or appropriate to impose the same form of tax on all these
distributions as on a dividend. In particular, the tax rate of the distributee will often not be the right rate, especially for a distribution
which terminates his interest. But some tax burden comparable to
that on a dividend is needed.
The proposal is to deal with nondividend distributions by subjecting them to an excise tax payable by the corporation at a rate
designed to approximate the overall rate on dividend distributions.
Another possibility, discussed in the ALI Report, is to tax continuing
shareholders as if the distribution had been pro rata, with the continuing shareholders using their share of it to buy out the distributee.
The governing objective should be to reduce the dichotomy in tax
burdens between different forms of transactions that people may
want to engage in, even if there are substantial differences between
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those transactions that require differences in the form of tax
imposed.
Finally, there is a highly technical third proposal. It deals with
intercorporate dividends and other aspects of intercorporate investment. Quickly summarized, if you go out and acquire the stock of
another corporation for cash or debt, these proposals say that payment of the purchase price is a nondividend distribution on which
you have to pay the excise tax or whatever other burden is attached
to distributions. Thereafter, it is perfectly appropriate to have an intercorporate dividend deduction or consolidation or whatever to eliminate anything more than a single level of corporate taxation. But
then what about a mere portfolio investment in shares of another
company? Should that be treated as a nondividend distribution? It
could be so treated, but everybody seems to agree that it would be
much more practical to treat portfolio investment as portfolio investment, exempting its purchase from the tax on nondividend distributions, but also denying it the benefit of any deduction for dividends
received. In effect, portfolio stock would be treated as representing
funds doubly in corporate solution; but this would tend to offset the
effect of the individual shareholders who sold out, getting their funds
out of corporate solution without a dividend tax or anything like it.
There is not time now to explore the implications of this proposal in
any detail, but I would like to close by pointing out that there are
several provisions in the presently pending tax bill to deal with perceived abuses in the application of the dividends-received deduction
to portfolio shareholdings, and by suggesting that the ALI Reporter's proposal on this subject would represent a much less ad hoc
way of dealing with the problem.
THE IMPACT OF

ACRS

Let me start by saying I agree substantially with Al's analysis of
the relation between integration and ACRS,8 and I think the relation
is essentially the same between ACRS and the ALI Reporter's distribution proposals. There is, however, another little wrinkle that I
am just going to throw out. The ALI Reporter's proposal on contributed capital is to allow a deduction for dividends paid, akin to the
interest deduction. The proposal says the deduction should be subject
to whatever limitations there are on the interest deduction. In other
words if the proceeds of a stock issue are invested in tax-exempt
8. See Warren, supra note 2, at 329.

bonds, then the deduction should be denied just as it would be by
section 2659 if it were an interest deduction. Some people talk about
responding to the problem that Al has described by imposing a limitation on the interest deduction when the proceeds are invested in
ACRS property. If one were to move in that direction, then under
the ALI Reporter's proposal, the same limitation would be called for
with respect to the equivalent deduction for contributed equity.
The wrinkle I want to point out is this. Our analysis of the matter
showed that even without any deduction for dividends there is a
compensating advantage for equity financing through accumulation
of earnings. If that is right, then the net effect would be the continuance of the double advantage of ACRS and individual tax deferral
whenever investments in ACRS property are financed with accumulated earnings, although you had eliminated the comparable double
advantage in the case of external financing by denying interest deductions and new equity dividend deductions. However, I do not
think there is any ready way to take away the double benefit in the
accumulated earnings case, which brings us back to the same conclusion Al has expressed, that it is ACRS itself that needs to be reexamined rather than the interest deduction.
CORPORATE INCOME TAXATIOi

WITH A PERSONAL CONSUMPTION

TAX

All right, the last topic is going to be touched on very, very quickly. The question is, what about a corporate income tax in a world
where individuals live under a personal consumption tax. I think all
there is time to do is try to state very briefly what a personal consumption tax is, and then make just a few remarks about a corporate
income tax under it.
A personal consumption tax, or expenditure tax, would be a tax on
the consumed or spent part of income, but not on the saved part of
income. It would be a tax on consumption rather than income, but
not measured by consumption transactions or sales transactions or
value added transactions. It would be an income-based consumption
tax; a tax whose computation would be based on personal income,
but with a subtraction for savings.
Consider a simple case: a person earns $100 and saves $20. His
taxable consumed income then would be $80, computed by subtracting $20 from $100. Because the tax is based on aggregate consumed income of an individual or household, the tax could be graduated, as is the present personal income tax, to whatever degree is
desired.
Deducting savings and taking dissavings into income is a much
9.

I.R.C. § 265 (1982).
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more familiar idea now than a few years ago, because it is just what
we do now with respect to individual retirement accounts (IRAs). A
consumed-income tax would do it on a more comprehensive basis, in
which all investments would qualify for IRA-like treatment, and all
disinvestments would enter equally into the tax base.
The most important respect, I think, in which a comprehensive
personal consumption tax would be drastically different from IRAs
and a piece-meal approach toward a consumption-based tax, is that
it would be comprehensive with respect to debt, too. Therefore, if a
person earned $100 and borrowed $20 during a particular year, and
invested $20 in his IRA, his taxable consumed income would remain
at $100. He would get a deduction for the investment in the IRA,
but he would have to include in his taxable consumed income the
proceeds of the loan, the result being that he would be taxed on the
full $100 that apparently was consumed. It would follow that the
repayment of the loan would be deductible in full, principal and interest alike.
So it would be a personal income tax except that all business and
investment transactions would be treated on a simple cash flow basis.
Deduct whatever you spend on business or investment when you
spend it, and take it back into income when you take it out of the
business or investment. Do not worry about whether it is a capital
expenditure or a current expense, since they are treated exactly
alike. If you spend it on business or investment, then it is not available for your current consumption and you can deduct it. If and when
you get it out, it is taxed.
Why would anybody modify the income tax in this manner or
adopt a tax of this form? One factor is equity or fairness; some people think that a tax on consumed income is essentially fairer than a
tax on income spent or saved. That is the subject Al Warren and I
debated in the articles cited by Lester at the beginning of this session.' 0 I still think that I was right, but Al argues the case for a total
income tax very skillfully, and this is clearly an arguable matter.
A second factor is efficiency, together with the other things economists are concerned about. There is an argument that a consumption
tax is more efficient because it does not discriminate between spend10. Andrews, A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 87
L. REV. 1113 (1974); Warren, Fairness and a Consumption-Type or Cash Flow
Personal Income Tax, 88 HARV. L. REv. 931 (1975); Andrews, Fairnessand the Choice
Between a Consumption-Type and an Accretion-Type PersonalIncome Tax: A Reply to
Professor Warren, 88 HARV. L. REv. 947 (1975).
HARV.

ing and saving, as a total income tax does. There is another argument that depends on the practicality of implementing both taxes; it
is that the consumption tax is more efficient because it is easier to
achieve equality of treatment of different investments under that
form of tax. The reason it is easier to achieve equality of treatment
is that cash flow is easier to measure comprehensively than is appreciation in value.
Some economists would apparently support a move toward a consumption tax on the ground that it would encourage capital accumulation. That is a tougher matter to judge. Theoretically, it is clear
that a switch to a consumption tax might have exactly the opposite
effect, just as the elimination of the income tax altogether might
make people work less since they do not need to work as hard to
support a particular standard of living. I am not sure that the data is
conclusive with respect to the question of which way saving would be
more likely in fact to vary.
Finally, there is the matter of simplicity and administrability. This
is where I started and still primarily stand. I think it would be wonderful to have at least a part of our major general revenue tax free
of the problems of telling a capital expenditure from a current expense; free from the problems of trying to figure out how fast a business asset wears out; free from the distortion that results from taxing
people on savings that they put in their savings accounts but not
taxing them on unrealized appreciation in their stock or the savings
in their pension plans. I think it would be better to treat them all
alike even if that involves not taxing savings at all. Imagine how tax
shelters would be treated under a consumption tax: they would be
taxed on a simple cash flow basis. You could deduct every nickel you
put in, when you put it in, and pay tax on every nickel that comes
out, when it comes out. The result of that would be that the tax
shelter would be effectively taxed at exactly the same rate as any
other investment -

zero -

not at enormous negative rates of tax as

under existing law.
Subchapter K? Read it out of the Code. Eliminate it. If all you
are interested in is what people have to spend, then all you need to
keep track of is what they put in and what they get out.
And, finally, Subchapter C? Subchapter C deals with taxes on
corporations and on shareholders. As to the latter, again it is very
simple. You give shareholders a deduction for whatever they invest,
and you include in their tax base whatever they get out, whether by
way of dividend or other form of distribution, or even from a sale of
shares to new investors.
But what about the corporate tax? What place has the corporate
tax under a consumption tax regime?
I suppose the first thing to say is that if you had had a personal
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consumption tax generally from the beginning rather than an income
tax, then there might seem to be no occasion for a corporate tax at
all. The pure solution for the corporate tax under a consumption tax,
therefore - the thing that might be thought of as equivalent to full
integration under an income tax - would be just to have no corporate tax at all. This is because whatever comes out of the corporation
will be accounted for and taxed forthwith at the individual level as a
result of the distribution, and whatever stays in corporate solution
represents saving and ought not to be taxed anyway.
But in the world we live in, you have the same problem as with
respect to integration under the income tax; that is to say do you
want to give up the revenue and confer the windfall involved in just
repealing the corporate income tax? Some people would answer that
question in the negative. So what do you do? The best answer to that
is spelled out in a book by the Meade Commission in England,'- for
those of you who want to pursue it. Essentially that answer is to put
the corporate income tax also on a cash flow basis. In absolute terms,
the effect would be a continuance of an additional burden on corporate earnings. But I think, as with the ALI Reporter's proposals
under the income tax, that it turns out to be possible to minimize the
marginal distortions of the tax while preserving its present distributional effects.
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